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Abstract Projection is widely used as a diagnostic for presupposition, but many
expression types yield projection even though they do not have standard properties
of presupposition, for example appositives, expressives, and honorifics (Potts 2005).
While it is possible to analyze projection piecemeal, clearly a unitary explanation
is to be preferred. Yet we show that standard explanations of projective behavior
(common ground based theories, anaphoric theories, and multi-dimensional theories)
do not extend to the full range of triggers. Instead, we propose an alternative
explanation based on the following claim, which is intended to apply to all content
which occurs in embedded contexts: Meanings project IFF they are not at-issue,
where at-issueness is defined in terms of the Roberts’ (1996) discourse theory. Thus,
and despite their apparent heterogeneity, projective meaning triggers emerge as a
natural class on the basis of the not at-issue status of their projective inference.
Keywords: presupposition; projection; at-issue; conventional implicature; accommodation
1 Introduction
The empirical phenomenon at the center of this paper is projection, which we define
(uncontroversially) as follows:
(1) Definition of projection
An implication projects if and only if it survives as an utterance implication
when the expression that triggers the implication occurs under the syntactic
scope of an entailment-cancelling operator.
Projection is observed, for example, with utterances containing aspectual verbs like
stop, as shown in (2) and (3) with examples from English and Paraguayan Guaraní
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(Paraguay, Tupí-Guaraní).1 The Guaraní example in (2) and its English translation
have at least the following implications: (i) Carla has previously smoked, and (ii)
Carla stopped smoking. The first but not the second of these implications is also
conveyed by the question version of sentence (2), as in (3a), or when (2) is embedded
under entailment-cancelling sentential operators, such as negation, as in (3b), the
antecedent of a conditional, as in (3c), or an epistemic modal, as in (3d). Hence, by
the definition in (1), the first but not the second implication of (2) projects.
(2) Cárla
Carla
o-heja
3-stop
la
the
jepita.
smoke
‘Carla stopped smoking.’
(3) a. Cárla-pa
Carla-QU
o-heja
3-stop
la
the
jepita?
smoke
‘Did Carla stop smoking?’
b. Cárla
Carla
nd-o-hejá-i
NEG-3-stop-NEG
la
the
jepita.
smoke
‘Carla did not stop smoking.’
c. Cárla
Carla
o-hejá-ramo
3-stop-if
la
the
jepita,
smoke
a-vy’a.
1sg-happy
‘If Carla stopped smoking, I am happy.’
d. I-katu
3-possible
Cárla
Carla
o-heja
3-stop
la
the
jepita.
smoke
‘It’s possible that Carla stopped smoking.’
Besides aspectual verbs, projection has been classically studied in conjunction
with the presuppositions triggered by factive verbs and nouns, definite noun phrases,
additive particles like too, clefts and intonational backgrounding, among others (e.g.
Langendoen & Savin 1971; Soames 1989; Beaver 1997). In much of the literature,
it has been assumed that implications which project are presuppositions, and that
projection is in some way a consequence of presuppositional status.
More recently, however, various authors have noticed that not all that projects is a
(standard classical) presupposition (e.g. Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990; Beaver
2001; Potts 2005; Roberts 2006; Roberts, Simons, Beaver & Tonhauser 2009). The
1 The Guaraní examples in this paper are given in the standardized orthography of Guaraní used in
Paraguay (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura 2004), except that all postpositions are attached to their
host. Following the official orthography, accents are not written for normally accented words (stress
on the final syllable); stressed nasal syllables are marked with a tilde. The following glosses are used:
1/2/3(sg) = first/second/third person (singular), IMP = imperative, NEG = negation, pron = pronoun,
QU = question marker, RC = relative clause.
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content of non-restrictive relative clauses (NRRCs), for example, projects but is not
presupposed (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990). The NRRC in (4a) introduces
the implication that Malena is Juan’s friend (in both the Guaraní and the English
versions) and this implication is also conveyed by the variant in (4b) where the
matrix clause is negated.
(4) a. Maléna,
Malena
ha’é-va
3.pron-RC
Juan
Juan
angiru,
friend
o-ho
3-go
Caaguasú-pe.
Caagasu-to
‘Malena, who is Juan’s friend, went to Caaguasu.’
b. Maléna,
Malena
ha’é-va
3.pron-RC
Juan
Juan
angiru,
friend
nd-o-hó-i
NEG-3-go-NEG
Caaguasú-pe.
Caaguasu-to
‘Malena, who is Juan’s friend, did not go to Caaguasu.’
The content of NRRCs belongs to the class that Potts (2005) identifies as conven-
tional implicatures. Other Pottsian CIs, including the content of epithets, honorifics
and appositives, also project but are not presupposed. In (5), the German second
person politeness morpheme Sie introduces the implication that the speaker is in
a deferential position with respect to the addressee; this implication is conveyed
although Sie occurs in the antecedent of a conditional, an entailment-cancelling
environment. The implications introduced by the appositive in (6), that Bill is a big
drinker, and by the expressive son-of-a-bitch in (7), that the speaker has a negative
attitude towards Bill, likewise survive as utterance implications in this environment.
(5) Falls
If
Sie
you(formal)
hungrig
hungry
sind,
are
wird
will
mein
my
Sohn
son
das
the
Essen
food
servieren.
serve
‘If you (formal) are hungry, my son will serve the food.’
(6) If Bill, a big drinker, is here, we’ll have fun.
(7) If that son-of-a-bitch Bill left, he’d better not have taken the flower arrange-
ment.
We hypothesize that projection is a unified phenomenon and in this paper develop
the proposal that the relevant implications of these diverse expression types project
because they share a pragmatic property, namely not-at-issueness, introduced in
detail below. Before turning to our proposal, we review in the next section three
previous approaches to projection. Since these were developed with only a subset of
projective meanings in mind, namely presuppositions, it is perhaps not surprising that
extending these approaches to the full range of projective meanings is problematic
for both empirical and theoretical reasons.
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2 Previous approaches to projection
2.1 Common ground approaches to projection
Among the best known explanations of projection are common ground approaches
(Stalnaker 1973, 1974; Karttunen 1974; Lewis 1979; Heim 1983). These approaches
are predicated on the assumption that utterances serve to update contexts, which are
typically construed as the common ground. When a sentence has a (conventional)
presupposition, context update is defined only if the relevant context entails the
content of the presupposition. When the presupposition is triggered by an embedded
constituent, its presuppositional requirements may be satisfied by a local extension
of the context. Global projection arises when the presuppositions triggered by an
embedded constituent must be satisfied by the initial (global) context. In the Guaraní
and English versions of (8), for example, the possessive noun phrase che-kyha ‘my
hammock’ triggers the presupposition that the speaker owns a hammock. Since this
presupposition is not satisfied locally, i.e. by the antecedent of the conditional, it must
be satisfied by the initial (global) context, resulting in the intuition of projection.
(8) Context: The speaker is standing next to her hammock.
Nde-kaigué-ramo,
2sg-lazy-if
e-ke
IMP.2sg-sleep
che-kyhá-pe.
1sg-hammock-in
‘If you’re feeling lazy, sleep in my hammock.’
Common ground approaches are generally appealing for accounting for the
behavior of a subset of presuppositions, including those of pronouns and of additive
particles like too. It is not clear, however, that all commonly recognized presuppo-
sition triggers are consistently associated with a common ground requirement (see
e.g. Abbott 2000 on definites, clefts and embedded announcements, and Simons
2007 on factives). Moreover, it is unnatural to extend this type of account to the full
range of projective meanings, many of which, as already discussed, are explicitly
distinguished from presuppositions. The content of NRRCs and appositives, for
example, is canonically intended as new information to the addressee (Chierchia &
McConnell-Ginet 1990; Beaver 2001; Potts 2005); the use of these expressions is
ruled out precisely when the relevant content is clearly common ground, as illustrated
by the infelicity of the second utterance in (9) as a continuation of the first.
(9) Bob and Carl are sledders. #Bob, a sledder, participated in the 2010 Winter
Olympic Games.
As is well known, even classic presupposition triggers can be used when the
presuppositions they trigger are not already in the common ground. These cases are
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typically treated within a common ground theory as involving accommodation — a
process of “pre-updating” the context (common ground) with the presuppositional
information prior to carrying out the update indicated by the sentence as a whole.
Following Lewis (1979), accommodation is often treated as a kind of rescue strategy,
triggered by an apparent violation of a common ground requirement.2 Suppose,
then, that one were to extend the common ground account to projective expressions
which are clearly allowed — perhaps only allowed — when their content is not in
the common ground. To do this, it would be necessary to allow that accommodation
is the default strategy for interpretation of these items. But this seems contrary to
the standard understanding of accommodation, as a process triggered by an actual,
observable, common ground constraint.
There is, moreover, evidence that true common ground constraints are in fact
not amenable to accommodation. Perhaps the most convincing cases of expressions
which robustly require some existing shared information are anaphors, including
ordinary pronouns as well as additive particles like too. These require the salience
(or familiarity) of an antecedent in the common ground: (10) is felicitous only if a
unique woman is salient in the common ground, thus satisfying the presupposition
of the pronoun she.
(10) If she didn’t sleep in the hammock, I don’t know where she slept.
The common ground requirement of anaphors is well known to resist accommodation
(e.g. Geurts & van der Sandt 2004; Zeevat 2002; Beaver & Zeevat 2007; von
Fintel 2008; Gauker 2008). Thus, in the paradigm case of a common ground
constraint, accommodation is generally ruled out. This suggests that it is conceptually
problematic to treat accommodation of common ground constraints as the norm for
some constructions. We conclude that common ground approaches to projection,
which were developed mainly with presuppositions in mind, cannot plausibly be
extended to capture projective behavior in general.
2.2 Anaphoric approaches to projection
Presuppositions are analyzed as a type of anaphor in e.g. van der Sandt (1992) and
Geurts (1999). The identification of an antecedent produces the effect of projection:
in e.g. van der Sandt’s Discourse Representation Theory model, the antecedent of
the pronoun she in (10) would preferably be accommodated in the global Discourse
Representation Structure, thus producing the effect of projection.
2 Stalnaker (e.g. Stalnaker 2002: pp.710–711), however, sees accommodation as part of the normal
evolution of contexts in response to incoming information, not as a rescue strategy. A formal model
of accommodation as evolution of common ground is given by Beaver 1992, 2001.
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Like the common ground approaches, the anaphoric approaches were never
claimed to account for the full range of projective meanings. In fact, it would be
unnatural to so extend them as there is no evidence that e.g. appositives or expressives
carry anaphoric requirements. Rather, there is evidence against such a requirement,
as illustrated by (9) above. The appositive “a sledder” in the second sentence of (9)
does not have an anaphoric requirement: if it did, we would expect the requirement
to be satisfied by the first utterance.
A second peculiarity of anaphoric approaches, at least if extended to the full
range of projective meanings, mirrors the issue discussed above for common ground
approaches: the paradigm cases of anaphoric presuppositions are precisely the cases
where accommodation is highly restricted. Thus it would be peculiar to explain
accommodation as the result of an anaphoric requirement.
2.3 Multicomponent approaches to projection
Karttunen & Peters (1979) and Potts (2005) divide meanings into independent
components (or dimensions). An utterance like (11a), for example, might be analyzed
into the two components in (11b):
(11) a. Bill, the son-of-a-bitch, owes me a drink.
b. 〈 owes(me, bill, drink), son-of-bitch(bill) 〉
In Potts’ (2005) system, conventional implicatures are a distinguished type of mean-
ing, which cannot interact semantically with ordinary, non-CI meanings and in
particular, cannot be arguments of operators which are part of the non-CI compo-
nent. This independence between meaning components is what gives rise to the
effect of projection in his model.
The proposal we advance below also maintains that projection is the result of
operators “ignoring” some of the content triggered in their scope. However, there
are two reasons we do not attempt to explain projection as a result of semantic inde-
pendence. First, while Potts provides empirical evidence for independence between
meaning components (e.g. with respect to binding between regular content and con-
ventional implicatures), his conclusions have been questioned by Amaral, Roberts
& Smith (2007), who provide evidence that there may be semantic dependencies
between ordinary content and conventional implicatures. Second, independence
of meaning components could not possibly be a general explanation of all types
of projection (and we must note here that Potts never claimed it could be), since
presuppositions interact with ordinary content, and e.g., can be bound. Historically,
this is perhaps the main reason why Karttunen & Peters’ (1979) two-component
model was dropped as an account of presupposition projection.
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3 Proposal: Not-at-issue content projects
The proposal we motivate in this paper is that projection is intimately tied to discourse
structure. We claim that projection is a consequence of the scope of sentential
operators such as negation, conditionals and modals typically being limited roughly
to what is understood as the main point, or, in the terminology we will use, the
at-issue content of the utterance. Whatever does not belong to the main point — the
not-at-issue content — is left out of the scope of the operator, and hence projects.
Thus, the specific hypotheses we will defend are these:
(12) Hypotheses about what projects and why
a. All and only those implications of (embedded) sentences which are not-
at-issue relative to the Question Under Discussion in the context have the
potential to project.
b. Operators (modals, negation, etc.) target at-issue content.
Before making the notion of at-issueness more precise below, we want to point
out that the idea that projective meanings have a particular discourse status is not
entirely new but has, in fact, been advanced under a number of related guises by
previous authors about different kinds of projective meanings. Stalnaker (1974: 198),
among others, describes presuppositions as “background beliefs of the speaker”,
which are “propositions whose truth he takes for granted, or seems to take for
granted, in making his statement” and Soames (1989: 553) likewise characterizes
presuppositions as having this non-central status in the set of propositions conveyed
by an utterance when he writes that “[t]o presuppose something is to take it for
granted in a way that contrasts with asserting it”; see also Chierchia & McConnell-
Ginet 1990: 280. Horton & Hirst (1988: 255) characterize a presupposition as “a
proposition that is conveyed by a sentence or utterance but is not part of the main
point”, with “not part of the main point” a notion not defined but reminiscent of
Potts’ general claim that the content of conventional implicatures is not at-issue,
or not ‘what is said’. Abbott (2000: 143f.) likewise hints at the relevance of the
discourse status of a proposition for projection when she writes that “...what is
asserted is what is presented as the main point of the utterance — what the speaker
is going on record as contributing to the discourse. [...] Anything else will have to
be expressed in another way, typically by being presupposed”. The remainder of this
paper fleshes out more precisely what it means for an implication to be not at-issue
in a particular discourse context and how such implications can be identified.
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4 Defining at-issueness
The notion of at-issueness which we will characterize draws on Roberts’ (1996)
concept of a Question Under Discussion (QUD). The QUD is a semantic question
(i.e. a set of alternative propositions) which corresponds to the current discourse
topic. The QUD may be the value of an actual question that has been asked; more
typically, it is implicit in the discourse. Once a question is under discussion, it
remains so until it has been answered or determined to be practically unanswerable.
We will say that such a question is resolved. Felicitous conversational moves must
constitute attempts to resolve the current QUD. We will say that an utterance which
constitutes such an attempt, or a speaker who produces an utterance which constitutes
such an attempt, addresses the QUD. Here, we restrict attention to two types of
conversational moves: assertions and questions.
Utterances can address the QUD in a variety of ways. The simplest way is just
to answer it. Answers can be complete or partial: A complete answer eliminates all
alternatives but one; a partial one eliminates at least one alternative. So, a complete
answer to the question: “Which students are defending this semester?” will list
all who are defending. An answer such as “Francesco, and maybe some others,”
constitutes only a partial answer. Assertions which constitute either complete or
partial answers to the QUD count as addressing the QUD. In addition, a speaker
may address the QUD by making an assertion whose content merely contextually
entails a (partial or complete) answer to the QUD. For example, a speaker might
answer the question “Is Avi old enough to drink?” by saying “He’s twenty-two.”
Assuming that the legal age for drinking in the relevant location is common ground,
then the assertion will contextually entail an answer to the question. Another way
to address the QUD is to raise another question, perhaps initially easier to answer
than the QUD itself, which will help in ultimately resolving the QUD, in the sense
that giving an answer to the new question will provide at least a partial answer to the
QUD. So, for example, a speaker might address the question “What will Bill drink?”
by raising the related question “Does Bill drink beer?”. Using these basic relations,
we define a notion of Relevance to the QUD for assertions and questions:
(13) Relevance to the QUD
a. An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff it contextually entails a partial or
complete answer to the QUD.
b. A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer which contextually
entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.
Relevance to the QUD is the fundamental notion in our definition of at-issueness.3
For technical reasons, rather than defining at-issueness directly for a proposition, we
3 This definition of Relevance is overly restrictive and should be weakened at least to allow for
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define it via the yes/no question associated with a proposition. For any proposition
p, let ?p denote the question whether p, i.e. the partition on the set of worlds with
members p and ¬p. Then the basic definition of at-issueness is:
(14) A proposition p is at-issue relative to a question Q iff ?p is relevant to Q.
In section 6, we’ll consider some apparent difficulties with this simple notion
of at-issueness, and consider a revision. To begin with, though, let’s see how the
proposed definition works in an example, how it gives rise to the desired predictions,
and some further desirable consequences of our general approach. In example (15),
A’s reply is our target utterance:
(15) Background scenario: a nutritionist has been visiting first grade classrooms
to talk to the children about healthy eating
Q: What most surprised you about the first graders?
A: They didn’t know that you can eat raw vegetables.
To identify the implications that project (from under the matrix clause negation) in
A’s utterance, we examine which implications of the proposition embedded under
negation, i.e. the implications of “They knew that you can eat raw vegetables”,
are (not-)at-issue. For ease of presentation, we examine only two of the candidate
propositions. The first candidate is the factive entailment:
(16) You can eat raw vegetables.
Let’s call this proposition p. From p, we derive the yes/no question ?p “Can you eat
raw vegetables?”. We then observe that in the context given, this question has no
answer which contextually entails an answer to the QUD Q in (15). That is, learning
that you can eat raw vegetables does not enable one to derive an answer to question
Q; and neither does learning that you cannot eat raw vegetables. Since ?p is not
relevant to the QUD, p is not-at-issue according to our definition in (14), and thus,
on our account, is predicted to project, according to hypothesis (12a), as indeed it is
observed to do.
Now we consider the maximal entailment of the embedded proposition:
(17) They knew that you can eat raw vegetables.
discourse moves which merely raise or lower the probability of some answer to the QUD being
correct. Consider for example the sequence: Q: “Is it going to rain?” A: “It’s cloudy.” A’s utterance
does not contextually entail an answer to the QUD (at least not in Pittsburgh, PA). Intuitively, it is
relevant because it somewhat raises the probability of an affirmative answer to the QUD. For now, we
restrict attention to the simpler type of case characterized by the definition given.
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Let’s call this proposition q. Again, we construct from q the associated yes/no
question ?q. The question of whether the knowledge claim holds has an answer (i.e.
the assertion) which contextually entails an answer to the QUD. Hence, this question
is relevant to the QUD, and hence q is at-issue. By hypothesis (12b), it is because it
is at-issue that it can be targeted by negation, and hence does not project.
5 Discussion of the hypotheses
5.1 Some desirable consequences
We have proposed that projective material is not-at-issue relative to the QUD, with
at-issueness characterized as relevance to the QUD. One important aspect of this
proposal is that it provides a unified account of projection, regardless of whether
the projecting element is a classical presupposition, a conventional implicature, or
something not easily classifiable (such as the prejacent of only).
Indeed, this proposal suggests a rather straightforward treatment of another
well-known case of projection, that of intonationally backgrounded material. There
is a long standing observation that this material projects, while focussed material
“associates” with operators, as illustrated by the examples in (18) from Kratzer 1989,
where the F-marked expressions are focused and targeted by negation:
(18) a. Paula isn’t registered in [Paris]F.
(≈ Paula is registered somewhere, not in Paris.)
b. [Paula]F isn’t registered in Paris.
(≈ Someone is registered in Paris, not Paula.)
Other researchers have proposed special purpose rules for explaining projection of
non-focussed material, most notably Geurts & van der Sandt (2004) in the recent
literature. For us, however, the observation is accounted for by two independently
motivated claims. First, we adopt the rather standard assumption that focus indi-
cates what question is under discussion (cf. Jackendoff 1972; Roberts 1996). The
QUD can, in effect, be constructed from intonationally prominent material, while
intonationally backgrounded material is treated as independent of the QUD, that is,
as not-at-issue. Second, we claim that not-at-issue material projects, cf. hypothesis
(12a). From these two claims, the observation about the projection of non-focussed
material follows directly. Certainly, this sketch requires further fleshing out, but it
suggests that this case of projection too can be brought under the umbrella of our
hypotheses.
There is a further very basic benefit yielded by our account. As discussed earlier,
there is a standard observation in the literature that typically projective material is
“backgrounded” (Stalnaker), “non-main-point” (Abbott) or “not-at-issue” (Potts).
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Our approach provides a straightforward explanation of this cluster of observations:
on our account, that which projects is necessarily not-at-issue.
5.2 Interaction of projection and answerhood
Our hypothesis that material projects if and only if it is not-at-issue predicts that
if typically projective material is rendered at-issue, it will fail to project. In this
section, we will argue that this is indeed the case; but we will also show that the
construction of examples which demonstrate this is a delicate matter.
The easiest way to test the prediction is in question/answer sequences, in which
conversational structure is transparent. However, the most basic examples of this
sort seem to run counter to our hypothesis. Consider for example:
(19) Q1: Are there any boys in your class?
A1: # I (don’t) like the boys in my class.
(20) Q2: What’s the weather like?
A2: # Bob realizes / doesn’t realize that it’s raining.
According to the simple version of our definition of at-issueness in (14), the presup-
positions of the responses in these sequences are at-issue and hence the responses
should be given non-projective readings. But, intuitively, we interpret the responses
as a whole as (inappropriately) answering the questions; that is, we seem to give the
responses readings in which the typical presuppositions indeed project.
Examples such these demonstrate, unsurprisingly, that attempts to answer ques-
tions using presuppositions or conventional implicatures are typically infelicitous.4
They appear, at first blush, to be counterexamples to our proposal because they allow
projection (of the presuppositions), even though this content is at-issue relative to
the QUD. Observe, though, that readings of the responses in (19) and (20) where the
presuppositions do not project would fail to give even partial answers to the QUD.
For example, on its non-projective reading, utterance of the negated version of A2 in
(20) is equivalent to “Either it is not raining, or it is raining and Bob doesn’t realize
that it is”. This fails to answer Q2, the question of what the weather is like, while also
introducing a completely irrelevant proposition regarding Bob’s knowledge state. A
4 Common ground approaches do not give satisfying accounts of the answerhood constraint even
for standard cases of presupposition since they must allow for transparent accommodation: a
presuppositional expression is used although it is transparent to speaker and addressee that the
relevant proposition was not part of the pre-utterance common ground. But if this is allowable, then
why shouldn’t this sort of accommodation be utilized to provide an answer to a question? To explain
this within a common ground approach, some additional principle would need to be invoked. But
this cannot be a principle along the lines of “Don’t pretend that material is common ground when it
obviously isn’t.”, because it would be violated by every case of transparent accommodation.
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listener is thus faced with a choice between two infelicitous readings: one reading
where negation has maximal scope (and the presupposition does not project), which
produces irrelevance to the QUD; and another (where the presupposition projects)
which provides an answer to the QUD, but requires a mismatch between projection
and at-issueness. We conclude, then, that the strong infelicity of these sequences
reflects the fact that neither the projective nor the non-projective interpretations
are conversationally appropriate. The apparent preference for a projective reading
may be due to the fact that this reading, although infelicitous, is still better than the
alternative non-projective reading; or may be due to the fact that, given that both
readings are bad, the default projective reading is prominent. (We return to the issue
of defaults below.)
Interestingly, identical or at least very similar examples to the ones we have just
looked at can be rendered quite acceptable given some additional background:
(21) Context: My daughter Chloe is writing invitations to her birthday party to
kids in her class. I notice that all of the invitations are to girls.
Mom: Are there any boys in your class?
Chloe: I don’t like the boys in my class.
(22) Context: Quentin, Ann and Bob have just eaten dinner at a restaurant where
the tip is usually incorporated into the bill. Bob handed Quentin what he
said was his share of the bill, then left the table. Quentin is confused by the
amount of money Bob has handed him:
Quentin: Are we supposed to leave a tip?
Ann: Bob doesn’t realize that the tip is included in the price.
These sequences appear to be counterexamples to the standard claim noted above,
that the answer to a question may not felicitously be given by presuppositional
content. They also appear to be counterexamples to our hypothesis, for the content
which projects is at-issue relative to the question asked.
But these sequences require a closer look. We need to consider why added con-
textual information makes the sequences felicitous, when, absent that information,
they seemed extremely odd. It appears that the effect of the added information is
to allow us to make inferences about the broader conversational goals of the ques-
tioner (as perceived by the responder), and thus to identify implicit questions under
discussion. Consider first example (21). In responding to the question, Chloe not
only answers the direct question actually asked, but also an implicit question along
the lines of “Why aren’t you inviting any boys to your party?”. The asserted content
of her response contains an answer to that question, while the existence implica-
tion is backgrounded (but can also be construed as at-issue, as we discuss below.)
What renders this sequence felicitous is precisely that it is possible to reconstruct
this higher question which is answered by the non-projective part of the response.
320
What projects and why
Sequence (22) is similar: Ann construes Quentin’s question as aimed at answering a
larger question, namely, “Why did Bob give me this amount of money?”.
Again, on a non-projecting reading, the responses in both cases would be irrele-
vant to the discourse topic. In order to find a felicitous interpretation for the response,
it is necessary to construct the higher question relative to which the typically pro-
jective material is not-at-issue. What differentiates between the contextualized
examples and the non-contextualized ones is simply the availability of informa-
tion which allows for the construction of this implicit question. Once the implicit
question is identified, the projective reading becomes consistent with our hypothesis.
If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find some question/answer
sequences where the at-issueness status of content affects projection. Here are two:
(23) Q3: Does France have a king?
A3: Well, the king of France didn’t attend the opening of Parliament.
(24) Q4: Is Harry dating Sally?
A4: Bill doesn’t know that he is.
Let’s work through what is going on with these sequences. A’s answer in (23)
receives an interpretation in which the existence implication of the definite does
not project over negation, an interpretation paraphrasable as “There was no king
of France attending the opening of Parliament”. Making sense of this response
requires accommodating an assumption that if there were a king of France, he would
attend the opening of Parliament. Given this assumption, the response can be read as
providing evidence that there may well not be a king of France. The felicity of the
response improves with a special intonation contour (c.f. the Uncertainty Contour of
Ward & Hirschberg 1985). We take the intonation and the discourse particle well to
signal a less-than-maximally coherent discourse move (see Schiffrin 1987 for well).
The existence implication of the definite is here clearly at-issue by our current
definition; and it does not project, as predicted by our hypothesis (12a). Unlike
examples (19) and (20), the non-projecting reading is relevant to the QUD (given
accommodation of the necessary assumption) and hence felicitous. Hence, in this
example, we can finally see the effect we wanted to demonstrate: projection is
suppressed where the relevant content is at-issue — but only where the resulting
non-projecting interpretation is itself relevant to the QUD.
Example (24) has a similar structure. The response A4 requires intonation
marking uncertainty. Given this intonation, it receives a non-projecting reading “It
is not the case that Bill knows that Harry is dating Sally”. Making sense of the
sequence again requires the accommodation of a particular assumption, in this case
the assumption that if Harry were dating Sally, Bill would know about it. Given this
assumption, the non-projecting reading of A4 is conversationally felicitous.
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6 Back to the definition of at-issueness
So far, we have worked with a rather simple definition of at-issueness, and a simple
characterization of the relationship between at-issueness and projection. In this
section, we discuss some complications and open questions.
The first issue in need of discussion is the role of convention. At-issueness, as
we have defined it in (14), is determined solely by conversational structure. Whether
or not a particular (propositional) implication of an utterance is at-issue depends
only on what the current QUD is. If the implication (or its negation) is a potential
answer to the QUD, the proposition is at-issue; otherwise, it is not.
But this runs counter to intuitions and observations that linguistic form is, at the
very least, a strong indicator of projective status — hence the widely accepted view
that presuppositions are conventional parts of lexical content. Now, it is also the case
that linguistic form is a strong indicator of at-issueness status. The use of a definite,
for example, is a good indicator that the question of existence of the relevant entity
is not under discussion. As we have seen, we can force the existential implication of
a definite to be at-issue, but this is not the norm. It is precisely such observations
which led us to our hypothesis connecting projection to at-issueness in the first place.
There is thus a natural way to connect at-issueness to conventional marking.
We posit that at least some constructions or lexical items conventionally mark their
content as not-at-issue. The infelicity of examples like (19) and (20) can then be
explained in terms of a mismatch between conventional marking and actual at-
issueness status: the material marked as not-at-issue is what carries the answer to
the question (hence is in fact at-issue); while the unmarked material which should
be the candidate for at-issue content is not relevant to the QUD.
We remain agnostic as to which expressions conventionally mark at-issue status.
In some cases where content introduced by an expression is typically not-at-issue,
an account in terms of general pragmatic principles may be available. We note
also that expressions which mark not-at-issueness apparently do so defeasibly. For
example, if definites are treated as indicators of the not-at-issue status of an existence
implication, it must be allowed that some uses are not so understood, given that
definites can sometimes be used felicitously to introduce at-issue content. Allowing
that at-issueness status is sometimes linguistically marked does not change the
predictions of our account as currently framed. Our hypothesis claims that material
projects if and only if it is actually not-at-issue. Since (by assumption) conventional
marking at most indicates a default expectation of not-at-issue status, such marking
is of very limited significance in the version of our theory considered so far.
This takes us to the second issue in need of discussion. Sometimes, more than
one proposition conveyed by an utterance turns out to be at-issue, according to
our current definition; and sometimes, these additional at-issue propositions are
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projective. Consider the following case, a slight modification of example (19) above:
(25) Q: Why aren’t you inviting any boys from your class to the party?
A: I don’t like the boys in my class.
As discussed above, the definite in A’s response gives rise to the implication that
there are boys in her class. But this proposition is at-issue relative to the QUD
since the question of whether or not there are boys in the class has an answer
(namely the negative) which would answer the QUD. We easily recognize that this
is not intended as (part of) the answer in part because of the form used. In light
of these observations, we propose a more complex (and admittedly less clear-cut)
characterization of at-issueness that takes into account the intention of the speaker.
(26) Revised definition of at-issueness
a. A proposition p is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via
?p.
b. An intention to address the QUD via ?p is felicitous only if:
i. ?p is relevant to the QUD, and
ii. the speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this
intention.
On this definition, speaker intention determines at-issueness. But speaker intention
is constrained by relevance to the QUD, and by the requirement that the intention
be identifiable by the addressee. This is how linguistic marking of at-issueness
status comes to affect projection: if some proposition is linguistically marked as
not-at-issue, then, as long as the resulting interpretation is felicitous in other respects,
the addressee will take it that the speaker does not intend to address the QUD via that
proposition. This allows us to deal with cases like (25): As the existence implication
is indicated to be not-at-issue, the addressee can safely treat it as such, and hence as
projective, taking the remaining content as the target of negation.
This approach also helps with cases of apparently at-issue NRRCs:
(27) Q:Who’s coming to the dinner tonight?
A:Well, I haven’t talked to Charles, who probably won’t be able to come, but
I did talk to Sally, who is coming.
Here, the (partial) answer to the overt question is contained in the NRRCs, but these
nonetheless project. (For further discussion and data, see Potts to appear.) The
following example, offered by Chris Barker (p.c.) involves an epithet:
(28) Q:What do you think of Bill?
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A:I’ve never met the son-of-a-bitch.
In example (27), we seem to find the at-issue content in the projecting NRRC, while
the main clause content is apparently irrelevant. However, the utterance is obviously
an appropriate response to the question. We suggest that this is again a case where
an implicit question must be reconstructed.
Rather than directly answering the overt question, A instead answers the question
of who she has talked to about the dinner, but includes answers to the overt question
in the NRRCs. As a discourse strategy, this is reasonable since ultimately it provides
more relevant information than a direct answer would have given. What makes
this strategy easily retrievable is the fact that the content of NRRCs is by default
not-at-issue. Something similar can be said about Barker’s example (28). Here it
seems that, superficially at least, A is refusing to answer the question explicitly
posed. Instead, A gives a negative answer to the unasked question of whether A
has met Bill, thus challenging Q’s presupposition that A is in a position to offer an
opinion about Bill. Since A’s negative attitude to Bill is not relevant to this question,
it survives as an utterance implication.
The characterization of at-issueness in terms of speaker intention gives us leeway
to resolve some difficulties that arise with the previous characterization in (14).
However, it makes some simple cases more difficult. Consider our treatment of
(23): We argued there that the existence implication of the definite was at-issue, by
virtue of the fact that it constitutes an answer to the QUD. According to the revised
definition, this implication is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via
the question of whether there is a king of France. But it is more intuitive here to say
that the speaker addresses the QUD via the question of whether the king of France
was at the opening of Parliament. It thus appears that in this case, the simpler notion
of at-issueness serves us better. We leave this as a topic for further investigation.
7 Conclusion
The proposal we have presented here would benefit from both development, and
further empirical work. For example, although the Guaraní data in section 1 provides
suggestive evidence for the cross-linguistic relevance of the issues we have discussed,
it remains open to what extent projective meaning is a locus of cross-linguistic
variation.5 However, there are three central planks to the theory we are constructing
for which we hope to have made a good case.
First, projection is a unified phenomenon, and therefore cannot be given an
account relying on specific properties of particular types of meanings (such as
5 Another empirical issue relates to experimental results of Jayez (2009), a response to an earlier
version of our proposal. For reasons of space, we cannot discuss those results here.
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presupposition or conventional implicature).
Second, the common property of projective meanings can be characterized in
terms of some notion of at-issueness utilizing the concept of relevance to a QUD.
Projection itself is intimately related to the structuring of information in discourse.
It is a consequence of the fact that in the totality of information conveyed by
an utterance, some is central to the speaker’s conversational goals, and some is
peripheral. The peripheral projects.
And finally, projection is not a matter of elements of content “escaping” the
scope of an operator, but rather of elements being “ignored” by operators. Speakers
use operators to target content which is central to their conversational goals.
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